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Introduction 
 
Local Dynamics in the Syrian Conflict 
Homegrown Links in Rebel Areas Blunt Jihadist Ascendency 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
The Assad family reign has been marked by the ubiquitous intrusion of the Alawite-
dominated security apparatus on the micro-level. The demise of the regime’s vast 
network of repression in many regions has resulted in local patterns of governance, 
restoring or generating old and new elites. With the jihadist ascendency, many of the 
emerging structures have been smothered by religious ideology. Yet, under the surface, 
local power has been shaped by area-specific relationships and embedded cultures. 
Support from Western actors has increasingly focused on local actors who are seen as 
being opposed to the Islamic State or al-Qaeda. Without a fundamental change in the 
nature of the regime, however, prospects for harnessing such local dynamics for the 
larger objective of stabilization will remain limited. 
 
Until the 2011 uprising, the security 
apparatus had prevented the emergence 
of local actors, except for those linked to 
the regime. The security agents, over-
whelmingly belonging to the minority 
Alawite sect, lived off – and enriched them-
selves through – extortion and protection 
rackets while providing a certain order. In 
areas under regime control, this system 
still holds. But where regime troops pulled 
out, it unraveled, and many local popula-
tions reclaimed ownership of their com-
munities. These rebel areas are largely 
populated by Sunni Muslims and comprise 
parts of northern, central, and southern 
Syria outside the control of the regime as 
well as the so-called Islamic State. 
To deal with the vacuum of governance 
created by the retreat of the regime, activ-
ists set up local councils and coordinated 
with the nascent Free Syrian Army (FSA). 
Starting in 2012, the jihadist ascendency 
and the influx of foreign fighters under-
mined the civic roots of the revolt and 
challenged the local structures of self-
governance. But the jihadists could not 
monopolize control over the rebel areas. 
Despite their firepower and use of violence, 
jihadists’ influence differs from one area 
to the other and depends on the clout of 
new or resurgent local elites, local religious 
and societal traditions, and the balance of 
power between the different rebel groups. 
Social imbalances relating to class and 
wealth and the legacy of social engineering 
employed by the Baath regime over decades 
likewise play a role. Ideologically, the local 
populations responded differently to the 
SWP Comments 34 
July 2016 
2 
jihadist creed, and often remained com-
mitted to the moderate core values that 
have been the hallmark of Islam as prac-
ticed in Syria for centuries. 
Al-Qaeda vs. the Southern Clans 
An example of local structures curbing ex-
tremism played out in the southern Hauran 
Plain, the original birthplace of the revolt 
and the biggest remaining stronghold of 
the Arab and Western-backed FSA. Across 
Syria, the quiet spread of Salafist beliefs 
brought back by Syrian expatriates re-
turning from Saudi Arabia as well as veter-
ans of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had 
prepared the ground for jihadism. Salafism 
in the south, however, remained tempered 
by Damascus-based clerics adhering to a 
rational tradition of Islam, who wielded 
influence over the area through trade links 
extending all the way to the Arab peninsu-
la. A small branch of the Masalmeh clan, 
some of whom had fought in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, formed a group that eventual-
ly linked up with the Nusra Front, and then 
with the self-declared Islamic State, and 
fought FSA units in Deraa. Yet, their influ-
ence remained limited, not least because 
their attempts to impose strict social codes 
(for instance, beating men who were caught 
smoking) did not go down well with a 
population that has traditionally combined 
devoutness with a degree of personal 
freedom.  
Hauran’s social organization into large 
clans also stood in the way of the jihadists. 
For instance, in 2014 a Nusra Front cell in 
Deraa, comprised mainly of members of 
the Hariri clan, pressured local clerics to 
declare an FSA unit as being comprised 
of kuffar (unbelievers) for receiving Western 
backing. The Nusra Front members encoun-
tered resistance from their own relatives 
in the Hariri clan, as the unit in question 
was led by an officer from the Nusairat 
clan, raising the specter of a blood feud 
between two major Haurani clans. 
 
Social Decline Amplifies 
Jihadist Appeal 
With the demise of formal governance, the 
clan as a social entity underwent a resur-
gence after the revolt. Clan structures and 
coherence, however, have been affected 
by the deteriorating living standards and 
the alienation of a new generation of poor 
youth wrought by the civil war – factors 
that have played into the hands of the 
Islamic State with its abundant cash 
reserves. Similar to the rest of rebel Syria, 
many youngsters were 12 to 14 years old 
when the revolt started and have been 
without education for more than five years. 
In private, local FSA commanders backed 
by the United States complain that their 
proposals to subsidize vulnerable youth 
with as little as $50 per month – so that 
they would stay home rather than join the 
Islamic State for the money – were turned 
down by Washington.  
More than the Nusra Front, the Islamic 
State appears to have a micro understand-
ing of the workings of local powers. For 
instance, the group won allies by helping to 
restore local elites who had been sidelined 
by the coercive realignments of society and 
the economy deployed by Hafez al-Assad 
to broaden the social base of his regime. 
In 2012, a rebel group called the Yarmouk 
Martyrs Brigade was formed in the Yar-
mouk River Valley near the border with 
Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan 
Heights. The group’s leader – a descendant 
of a local notable family by the name of 
Abu Ali al-Baridi – had links with senior 
jihadists, veterans of the Afghanistan war 
with access to cash through apparent links 
with al-Qaeda. The founders also included 
the Jaounis, a large family of Palestinian 
origin. Freed from the control of the Assad 
regime, the Baridis and Jaounis reestab-
lished themselves as the de facto rulers of 
the Yarmouk Valley. When initial Jordanian 
funding dried up in 2015, Baridi apparently 
allied himself with the Islamic State. As a 
result, fighting started between the Yar-
mouk Martyrs and the Nusra Front, as well 
as Jordanian-backed FSA brigades. In No-
SWP Comments 34 
July 2016 
3 
vember 2015, Baridi, his deputy Abu Abdal-
lah al-Jaouni, and others in the top leader-
ship tier of the group were killed in a sui-
cide attack in the village of Jamleh, possibly 
with the help of a local clan at odds with 
the Baridis. That did not spell the end of the 
Yarmouk Martyrs, though: the combination 
of the difficult terrain and the standing of 
the Jaouni and the Baridi clans has proved 
hard to defeat. 
Although the FSA has held its ground 
in the south, power centers built around it 
have in some cases compounded imbalanc-
es resulting from deteriorating economic 
conditions, providing inroads for the Is-
lamic State. The FSA brigades in Hauran, 
most of whom are linked to the US-led 
Military Operations Centre in Jordan, are 
underpinned by membership from promi-
nent local clans. In contrast, one group, 
called Jaish al-Jihad, originated in a camp 
in Deraa for refugees from the Golan 
Heights and their descendants. Lacking 
both clan pedigree and resources, Jaish 
al-Jihad received little local or outside sup-
port, making it receptive to the Islamic 
State, with which it eventually struck an 
alliance. Conversely, Jaish al-Jihad’s lack 
of clan backing also made it easier for the 
FSA to take on this group, as opposed to 
the Yarmouk Martyrs. 
Local Pragmatism 
In other areas of Syria, local communities 
lacking any external support often tended 
to deal with the jihadists pragmatically. In 
southern parts of Idlib province, local elites 
needed the Nusra Front’s firepower to ward 
off regime attacks. But they hedged their 
bets by striking alliances with other 
Islamist – though less radical – groups.  
Idlib province, which borders Turkey, 
fell completely under rebel control in 2015 
after an offensive mostly carried out by an 
on-and-off alliance between the Nusra Front 
and its Salafist rival, Ahrar al-Sham. In the 
town of Kfar Nubul – a community on the 
fringes of Idlib, where civic activists with 
an egalitarian orientation were particular 
well organized – the local FSA brigade 
maintained a presence by simultaneously 
cooperating with the Nusra Front and 
playing on the rivalry between the Nusra 
Front and Ahrar al-Sham. Interestingly, 
many supporters of the Nusra Front in the 
town are former Baath functionaries who 
were excluded from the civic organizations 
established after the revolt, and joined the 
Islamists to preserve their positions and 
protect themselves. To avoid confrontation, 
locals have tended to observe Nusra Front 
edicts to close down shops during prayer 
time, but many support Ahrar al-Sham. 
Unlike in other towns, where Nusra was 
able to monopolize the supply of bread, 
Ahrar al-Sham and the FSA brigades also 
run their own bakeries in Kfar Nubul, 
denying the Front the power that comes 
with control over this crucial staple. But 
the balance in Kfar Nubul – and the capaci-
ty of the local council to maneuver between 
the jihadi groups – has been tenuous. Coun-
cil members have been kidnapped for 
allegedly supporting rival groups, prompt-
ing civic activists to call for all armed 
groups to leave the town. The Nusra Front 
responded by closing down an independent 
radio station in Kfar Nubul in June 2016. 
Shortly after, the founder of the station 
was injured in an assassination attempt in 
Aleppo, while a prominent citizen jour-
nalist in his company was killed in the 
attack. Still, all-out warfare has been avoid-
ed in Kfar Nubul, as most members of the 
armed factions hail from Kfar Nubul itself 
and have showed a degree of local sensibili-
ty, aided by a historical lack of class and 
clan differences in the town. 
In turf battles with other rebels in Idlib, 
the Nusra Front also appears to have been 
aware of the local element. When the group 
attacked installations belonging to the local 
FSA unit in the town of Maarat al-Numaan 
in 2015 and encountered local protests, 
only Nusra Front troops recruited from 
outside the town were used. Apparently, 
the Nusra Front preferred to not test the 
loyalty of members recruited from Maarat 
al-Numaan by having them shoot at their 
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fellow townsfolk. Pragmatism has also been 
a dominant feature in the al-Rouj region, 
which is a collection of agricultural villages 
in the southwest of Idlib province. Here, 
the Nusra Front has been seen as a bulwark 
against regime forces concentrated in the 
neighboring governorate of Latakia. But its 
welcome has been tempered by weariness 
of foreign and non-local Syrian fighters, 
such as Beduin who were driven out of 
their home area around Deir al-Zor by the 
Islamic State. Seen as overzealous and con-
temptuous toward the locals, these Beduin 
units have caused significant resentment. 
Jihadists Compensate for Scarce 
Resources 
Yet, the fate of homegrown groups that 
took on the Nusra Front on their own have 
served as cautionary tales for others in the 
region. One was the Idlib Martyrs Brigade, 
formed in 2012 by members of the Sayyed 
Issa family, which had been persecuted by 
the regime in the 1980s for supporting the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In 2013, the Idlib 
Martyrs were defeated by the Nusra Front 
in battles in the western Idlib countryside. 
The Nusra Front hounded the remaining 
members of the group for months after the 
confrontation, killing them or forcing some 
to join their fighting units, where they 
were used as cannon fodder on the front 
lines. Other local rebel groups such as the 
so-called Free Men of the Middle Mountain 
Brigade attempted to ward off encroach-
ment by the Nusra Front by joining its 
main rival, Ahrar al-Sham. Such alliances 
were, however, often merely tactical and 
did not reflect commitment to the group’s 
Salafist creed, but rather the lack of – and 
urgent need for – external support to hold 
their ground against the jihadis. Ultimate-
ly, the need for resources – initially to fight 
the regime, and later competing groups – 
remains the key factor that determines how 
rebel groups deal with the jihadis. This is 
obvious in the trajectory of the Homs-based 
rebel group, which staged one of the land-
mark attacks on Assad’s forces during the 
initial phase of the revolt’s militarization. 
In November 2011, rebels from the Khali-
diya neighborhood killed six pilots and 
other military personnel in an ambush set 
up to take hostages, who would then be 
exchanged for men from Khalidiya who 
had been arrested by the regime during the 
initially peaceful protests in Homs. The 
operation went awry when the soldiers on 
the bus detected the ambush, and all were 
killed in the firefight that ensued. The rebel 
squad operated under an FSA banner, but 
the men who attacked the bus were fi-
nanced by a Syrian expatriate from Khali-
diya who lived in Saudi Arabia. When this 
funding dried up, the group, which was led 
by the former imam of a Khalidiya mosque 
known as Abu Yazan, shifted allegiance 
to the Nusra Front; when the latter’s posi-
tion in the Homs region deteriorated, they 
switched allegiance to the Islamic State. 
All along, their objectives remained local, 
first and foremost. While focused on taking 
revenge against the regime for the violence 
it had dealt the neighborhood, Abu Yazan 
remained highly pragmatic. Any ally who 
would help fight the Assad regime was 
welcome. 
Resilience of a Civic Model 
In other cases, local religious traditions 
constitute another element in understand-
ing the dynamics of the conflict. On the 
grassroots level, political and religious 
awareness sometimes have provided the 
means to address local tensions, deal with 
jihadists, and cope with the regime’s siege 
warfare. Most of the hinterland of Damas-
cus – a patchwork of recently built-up areas 
and farmland known as the Ghouta – is 
overwhelmingly Sunni. Salafi thought has 
been spreading in such areas since the 
American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Yet, 
the town of Daraya in the southwestern 
Ghouta stood out for its particular tradition 
of civic awareness underpinned by religious 
commitment. Founded by the Islamic 
scholar Jawdat Saeed, the Daraya school 
had developed an Islamic theory of civic 
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and peaceful resistance against oppressive 
rulers. Unlike Sunni clerics backed by the 
regime, who bestowed religious legitimacy 
on Hafez al-Assad while steering the popu-
lace away from politics, Saeed called for 
political engagement. His body of work is 
also positioned against the approach of 
the late Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist 
ideologue whose theories had a formative 
influence on the founders of al-Qaeda. 
Already a decade before the revolt, youth 
from Daraya had embarked on campaigns 
to clean the streets and improve conditions 
in their neglected suburb. To the regime, 
such civic activities were a challenge to its 
monopoly over all forms of social organiza-
tion. Dozens were arrested, tortured, or 
forced to flee the country. When the revolt 
broke out, these pre-existing local struc-
tures and experiences generated large 
demonstrations and a council staffed by 
educated members who worked along 
specialized lines. Daraya became a civic 
model for many Syrians opposed to Assad, 
and accordingly was dealt a particularly 
brutal crackdown early on. Three Daraya 
youth injured by regime gunfire at a pro-
democracy demonstration were shot dead 
in their beds at a government hospital. 
Ghiyath Matar, a 25-year-old follower of 
Saeed, distributed flowers and water to 
Assad’s soldiers, but was arrested, tortured, 
and killed by Airforce Intelligence in Sep-
tember 2011. Western ambassadors, who 
were still in Damascus at the time, went 
collectively to Daraya to pay their condo-
lences, but the gesture did nothing to 
mitigate the crackdown. Attracted by the 
Daraya model, Issam Zaghloul, a Dama-
scene lawyer, went to the suburb and em-
barked on setting up an independent court. 
Secret police abducted Zaghloul from his 
office in Damascus, and he is presumed to 
have died in Assad’s security dungeons. In 
one of several regime offensives, the mostly 
Alawite Republican Guards overran Daraya 
in 2012 and summarily executed hundreds 
of young men. The killings spurred large-
scale armed resistance in Daraya that drove 
out Assad’s forces from most of the suburb, 
which fell under regime siege later in the 
same year. The rebels, many of whom were 
local protesters who took up arms after the 
crackdown, remained in close coordination 
with the local council and refrained from 
interfering in it. Daraya also relied on the 
support of expatriates from the town as 
well as educated youth who had fled the 
crackdown but resumed their activism in 
Turkey and the West. Under international 
pressure, in June 2016 the regime allowed 
the first food delivery into Daraya since 
2012, where several thousand civilians – 
of an original population of 80,000 – still 
live under siege. Today, Daraya is highly 
vulnerable to fall to a renewed regime of-
fensive after extensive aerial bombardment 
weakened the rebels’ defense parameters. 
Tales of Two Cities 
By contrast, in the eastern part of the 
Ghouta, a harsher and power-hungry 
school of Islam produced an undemocratic 
model of rebel governance that exacerbated 
local differences and became prone to 
corruption. The region was also an early 
casualty of the regime’s strategy to under-
mine the civic and peaceful orientation of 
the revolt by injecting radical elements. In 
June 2011, the authorities released Zahran 
Alloush from prison – a Salafist cleric and 
a native of Douma, one of the largest sub-
urbs in Eastern Ghouta – along with other 
jihadists who had fought in Iraq. With 
Saudi financial backing, Alloush set up 
what by 2013 became the “Army of Islam” 
(Jaish al-Islam), which evolved into one of 
the largest rebel groups – numbering an 
estimated 15,000 fighters – as well as being 
one of the most well-equipped and funded. 
A key figure in securing support from 
Riyadh has been Alloush’s father, Abdullah, 
a preacher in exile with close links to the 
Wahhabi clerical establishment, which 
underpins the Saudi monarchy. Initially, 
Jaish al-Islam captured large arms depots 
from the regime and had supply routes 
opened to Jordan and Turkey, before 
Assad’s troops and Iranian-backed Shi’ite 
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militia imposed a tight siege on the Eastern 
Ghouta. In 2014, Jaish al-Islam expelled the 
Islamic State from Eastern Ghouta, where it 
had made inroads in 2013 by relying on 
recruits drawn largely from Golan Heights 
refugees in the nearby district of Hajar al-
Aswad. 
Realizing the strength of Jaish al-Islam, 
the Nusra Front and other groups operating 
in Eastern Ghouta kept their heads low as 
Alloush consolidated power. But resent-
ment rose against Alloush as he imprisoned 
members of other armed factions. Jaish al-
Islam also stands accused of abducting four 
prominent secular activists who had taken 
refuge in Douma and disappeared in 
August 2014. The “Douma Four” include 
human rights lawyer Razan Zaitouneh, 
who, after the revolt, helped found grass-
roots organizations known as local coor-
dination committees, and Samira Khalil, a 
former political prisoner and wife of Yassin 
al-Khalil Haj-Saleh, a veteran leftist who is 
now in Istanbul. 
Localized war economies that formed 
during the civil war also helped foster new 
networks and rivalries. Resentment grew 
over favoritism within Jaish al-Islam, but 
in particular about the group having ex-
ploited the siege imposed by the regime as 
a business opportunity. Situated at the edge 
of Eastern Ghouta, Douma became a hub 
for tunnels dug under a main highway that 
would supply the rebel districts of Qaboun 
and Barzeh, closer to Damascus. The tunnel 
trade disproportionally benefited Alloush’s 
protégés and merchants from Douma. 
Unlike their peers in Damascus, most 
merchants in Douma had not hesitated to 
back the revolt. Many viewed themselves as 
discriminated against and marginalized 
by the regime’s alliance with the business 
class of the capital. Still, the Douma elite 
became seen as growing rich at the expense 
of the rest of Eastern Ghouta. Other rebels 
benefited from the tunnel trade, too. But 
Alloush, who was killed in an air strike in 
December 2015, became an embodiment of 
a revolt gone wrong. Jaish al-Islam under-
mined local governance by interfering in 
local councils and refused to submit to the 
authority of the Unified Judiciary Council – 
a tribunal including representatives of the 
various brigades in Eastern Ghouta that 
was supposed to arbitrate in disputes be-
tween rebel groups and as an independent 
court drawing on a mix of religious and 
civic law. But Jaish al-Islam refused to hand 
over hundreds of prisoners in its custody 
to the tribunal, many of whom had been 
captured in turf warfare and have not been 
heard from since. Families of the prisoners 
joined a growing civic protest movement 
in Ghouta against Jaish al-Islam, but to no 
avail. Male relatives of the prisoners often 
ended up joining the Nusra Front, moti-
vated more by resentment against Jaish al-
Islam than by jihadist leanings. Tension 
burst into open warfare in May 2016, with 
hundreds of fighters from Jaish al-Islam 
and rival rebel factions – including the 
Nusra Front – reportedly killed. The Assad 
regime and Hezbollah took advantage of 
the infighting and captured several towns 
and large tracts of agricultural land in the 
Eastern Ghouta virtually unopposed, re-
ducing rebel territory in Eastern Ghouta 
approximately by a quarter. 
At the same time, the limited ceasefire 
deal agreed upon by Russia and the United 
States in February 2016 reduced the threat 
of aerial bombings by the regime, encour-
aging civilians in Eastern Ghouta to take 
to the streets again and protest against the 
rebels across the board for endangering 
Eastern Ghouta. Jaish al-Islam’s conduct has 
also undermined its cohesiveness: members 
of a brigade stationed in the nearby Damas-
cus district of Qaboun stayed away from the 
fighting in Eastern Ghouta, considering it 
a selfish and unnecessary turf war between 
Douma and the other towns. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
The attitudes and interests of old and new 
local elites have played a main role in con-
taining or expanding the jihadist reach. 
They have also provided governance where 
the Syrian state, which had been captured 
by the extended Assad clan, had been 
forced to withdraw. Any attempts to solve 
the Syrian conflict with diplomatic means 
and reconstruct Syria as a coherent politi-
cal unit will have to rely on their coopera-
tion. This may require difficult choices: by 
far not all of the groups and brigades that 
wield power on the ground and/or enjoy 
legitimacy among local populations may 
appear palatable to Western actors. At the 
same time, the high variety in local pat-
terns of interaction indicate that behind 
the smoke screen of Islamist ideology, 
many groups may be receptive to incentives 
that lead to different approaches. For in-
stance, a formation such as Ahrar al-Sham 
could be key. The group has often acted as 
a balancing force in rebel areas, and has 
been torn between hardliners and more 
pragmatic figures. Including the latter 
elements in a pacification process could 
be part of a larger process that separates 
those Islamists who are ready to respect a 
(admittedly low) minimum of democratic 
and humanitarian ground rules from the 
jihadi hard core that will have to be con-
tained and rolled back by military force. 
At the same time, such pragmatism finds 
its limits when it comes to a continuation 
of Assad’s rule and Alawite domination. 
Local alliances have shifted in sometimes 
unpredictable ways and several times over, 
but few, if any, rebels have ever sought or 
accepted support from regime troops and 
militias against their rivals. Thus, the cur-
rent strategy pursued by Western nations 
and some Arab countries, such as Jordan 
and the United Arab Emirates, to restrict 
support to actors who make fighting the 
Islamic State and al-Qaeda a priority, while 
“leaving Assad for later,” is likely to back-
fire. Where FSA units appear to comply 
with these pressures, their local legitimacy 
suffers and jihadis gain support. For in-
stance, in the south many activists already 
refer to the southern brigades of the FSA 
as Sahawat, an allusion to the Iraqi militias 
of that name which helped the American 
occupation forces to defeat al-Qaeda in 
Sunni-majority areas after 2006, but 
achieved few political gains for the Sunnis. 
In northern Syria, the United States has 
backed the Kurdish PYD (Democratic Union 
Party) – the Syrian branch of the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) – even as the 
group advanced beyond the areas tradi-
tionally settled by Kurds and into Arab 
territory. The PYD advance raises concern 
across local rebel communities that the 
Sunni rebel areas – with Western collusion 
– are being squeezed between the regime 
on the coast, the Islamic State to the east, 
the Kurdish militia in the north, and a 
Jordanian and Western-backed mercenary 
force in the south, with the objective of 
imposing a solution that amounts to little 
more than a facelift for the Assad regime. 
International Diplomacy 
On the diplomatic side, more and more 
members of the mainstream Syrian opposi-
tion see the negotiations in Geneva as an 
attempt to impose just such a formula, 
with changes being restricted to the formal 
makeup of the political institutions and a 
token increase of Sunnis and other com-
munities in positions of nominal power.  
Yet, the key for substantial change and 
for harnessing the civic and democratic 
potentials in Syrian society – including the 
local elites in the rebel areas – lies in a 
radical overhaul of the security sector, 
where the real power resides. Reform of the 
security sector is slotted as a topic in the 
Geneva peace talks and appears to be a 
priority for Germany, which is a member 
of the International Syria Support Group 
(ISSG). Russia, on the other hand, appears 
more than happy to endorse the security 
sector as is. But the enormous size, reach, 
and sectarian composition of the numerous 
security branches should be slashed. Only 
by turning them into fully accountable 
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bodies operating under civilian law and 
politically neutral (or bi-partisan) oversight 
would a fundamental shift in the structure 
of the Syrian system be possible. It could 
also take the sting out of an increasingly 
sectarian discourse that blames Alawites as 
a sect – rather than the small circle of Ala-
wites who hold the reins of power – for the 
crackdown on the revolt and the subse-
quent destruction that befell rebel areas.  
The time for such an approach may be 
running out, however. Local elites are less 
and less able to integrate and control the 
youth in rebel areas, more and more of 
whom have become impoverished and 
uprooted and who are deprived of educa-
tion. They form a ready recruiting ground 
for the Islamic State and other radical 
groups, which will undermine efforts to 
bring local communities into any frame-
work that may be established through the 
Geneva process. On the other end of the 
spectrum, thousands of peaceful and 
educated Syrians have been languishing 
in Assad’s jails and underground dungeons 
since the crackdown on the revolt and the 
subsequent waves of arrests and abduc-
tions. Many have already died or disap-
peared, but their fates have been largely 
treated by the ISSG as a footnote. Aside 
from the humanitarian imperative, their 
presence could be crucial for the stabiliza-
tion of the local level, especially if a settle-
ment is reached that opens the way for 
them to reestablish themselves in their 
hometowns. The same holds true for the 
thousands of civic activists who fled the 
country and would need effective security 
guarantees to be able to return and con-
tribute toward the restoration of state 
structures that would serve the Syrian 
people, rather than the survival in power 
of a small, corrupt, and excessively violent 
and sectarian elite. 
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